RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN TRADEMARK LAW:
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ABSTRACT

The year 2003 saw a great deal of activity in the ongoing development
of trademark law. While the law both reconnected with its bricksand-mortar roots and expanded to accommodate new fact patterns in
the late 1990's and early 2000's, 2003 saw the beginning of a doctrinal
contraction, with a requirement to tie inchoate harms to empirical
foundations. Additionally, several issues of first impression were
resolved, including the conclusion that domain names are a form of
property. While 2003 saw a contraction of trademark rights, this is
not necessarily a negative development for trademark owners.
Instead, courts are merely refining the underlying doctrine and
requiring the same types of empirical foundations that have been
required in trademark law for decades. This article will explore these
recent developments and discuss where they leave the area of
trademark law today.
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INTRODUCTION
"It is indisputable that in very recent years the Internet has drastically changed
the way the world does business."'
With the advent and proliferation of the
Internet, everyone quickly proclaimed a new era of both law and society:
The Internet represents a revolutionary advance in communication
technology. It has been suggested that the Internet may be the 'greatest
innovation in speech since the invention of the printing press.' It allows
people from all over the world to exchange ideas and information freely and
in 'real-time.' Through the use of the Internet, 'any person with a phone
line can become a town crier with a voice that resonates farther than it
2
could from any soapbox.'
Nevertheless, the law had not yet fully caught up to this revolution. As a result,
the legal landscape surrounding intellectual property law resembled the Wild West.
Many trademark owners were making poor decisions and trademark attorneys were
providing even poorer advice. Some were paying cybersquatters exorbitant amounts
of money in exchange for domain names. Others were filing lawsuits that produced
harmful results because they failed to recognize the courts' reluctance to create new
law when existing law would do. Many were overreaching and acting inadvisably in
an ad hoc manner or without adequate evidence. This practice continued into the
late 1990's.
Just as the Internet began to explode however, Judge Easterbrook gave
surprising advice: "[K]eep doing what you have been doing. Most behavior in
cyberspace is easy to classify under current property principles." 3 Following the
initial Hobbesian chaos and early infatuation with the new and revolutionary
medium, this advice was heeded by courts. They recognized that the brick-andmortar law applies to the Internet:
Some of the evidence in this case strongly suggests that some companies
operating in the area of the Internet may have a misconception that,
* This Article is based on an address given at the 48th Annual Conference on Developments
in Intellectual Property Law at the John Marshall Law School in Chicago, Illinois on Feb. 27, 2004.
**Associate with Pattishall, McAuliffe, Newbury, Hilliard & Geraldson in Chicago, Illinois.
Yale Law School (J.D. 2001, Editor-in-Chief, Yale Symposium on Law and Technology). The views
expressed herein are solely those of the author and should not be attributed to his firm or clients.
1 Resnick v. Manfredy, 52 F. Supp. 2d 462, 466-67 (E.D. Pa. 1999) (citation omitted).
2 Doe v. 2TheMart.com, Inc., 140 F. Supp. 2d 1088, 1091 (W.D. Wash. 2001) (emphasis added)
(internal citation omitted) (quoting Reno v. Am. Civil Liberties Union, 521 U.S. 844, 870 (1997)).
3 Frank H. Easterbrook, Cyberspaeo and the Law of the Horse, U. CHI. LEGAL F. 207, 210
(1996).
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because their technology is somewhat novel, they are somehow immune
from the ordinary application of the laws of the United States .... They
4
need to understand that the law' domain knows no such Jimits.
Similarly, courts demanded that the traditional balance of trademark rights be
mirrored in cyberspace: "The challenge for the courts is to recognize that the Internet
has erased boundaries while still respecting both trademark rights and the limits of
5
those rights."
Thus, courts applied traditional principles of trademark law and went back to
business as usual, or so they thought.
Unfortunately, courts' application of
traditional doctrines to these new fact patterns highlighted an ongoing problem in
the development of the law: an infatuation with judge-made doctrines and a
willingness to accept ephemeral, amorphous, and often empirically unsupported
harms.
The year 2003 ushered in a new phase in the ongoing development of trademark
law. While the law both reconnected with its bricks-and-mortar roots and expanded
to accommodate new fact patterns in the late 1990's and early 2000's, 2003 saw the
beginning of a doctrinal contraction, with a requirement to tie inchoate harms to
empirical foundations.

I. THE SUPREME COURT'S ONGOING INTEREST
The Supreme Court has shown interest in trademark law over the last fifteen
years deciding Bonito BoatsC (1989), Two Pesos' (1992) and Qualitex8 (1995). Since
2000, the Supreme Court's interest has significantly increased with Wal-Mart Stores9
(2000), TrafFix1° (2001), Moseley11(2003), and DaStar12 (2003). This interest does not
appear to be waning with the Court's granting of certiorari in another case for 2004.13
This recent flurry of cases demonstrates the importance of trademark law in helping
to shape societal institutions and manage business expectations both in the bricksand-mortar world and cyberspace.
While not involving cyberspace per se, the flurry of Supreme Court cases since
the explosion of the Internet can be viewed as a reaction to lower courts' use of
trademark law in cyberspace.
As noted, 2003 signifies a shift towards the
contraction of trademark rights. This shift began in 2000 with Wal-Mart Stores,
where the Court narrowed the principle from Two Pesos by holding that a product
design can never be inherently distinctive and thus can only be protected trade dress
4 UMG Recordings, Inc. v. MP3.COM, Inc., No. 00 Civ. 427(JSR), 2000 WL 1262568, at *6
(S.D.N.Y. Sept. 6, 2000).
Simon Prop. Group v. mySimon, Inc., 104 F. Supp. 2d 1033, 1037 (S.D. Ind. 2000).
6 Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141 (1989).
7Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763 (1992).
s Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 514 U.S. 159 (1995).
9 Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara Bros., 529 U.S. 205 (2000).

10TrafFix Devices, Inc. v. Mktg. Displays, Inc., 532 U.S. 23 (2001).
11Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue, Inc., 537 U.S. 418 (2003).
12Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 539 U.S. 23 (2003).
13See KP Permanent Make-Up, Inc. v. Lasting Impression, Inc., 124 S. Ct. 981 (2004).
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upon acquiring secondary meaning. 14
While acknowledging that Two Pesos
established the legal principle that trade dress can be inherently distinctive, Justice
Scalia restricted the holding in Two Pesos to "product packaging" trade dress or some
"tertium quid that is akin to product packaging trade dress." 15 Justice Scalia then
concluded that the Two Pesos holding therefore had no relevance in the Wal-Mart
16
Stores case because that case involved "product-design trade dress."
In TraffFix, the Supreme Court held that an expired utility patent created a
strong presumption of functionality, and thus the design in question was not eligible
for trademark protection. 17 This once again cut down on trademark owners' (and
courts') efforts to expand trademark rights. This contraction continued with the
Court's most recent decisions in Moseley and Dastar.

A. VSecret Catalogue,Inc., v. Moseley
In February of 1998, Victor and Cathy Moseley opened a store in Elizabethtown,
Kentucky, which they called "Victor's Secret," specializing in men's and women's
lingerie, adult videos, sex toys and "adult novelties." 18 Before long, the Moseleys
received a cease and desist letter from V Secret Catalogue, claiming that the
Moseleys' store name violated V Secret's rights in the VICTORIA'S SECRET
trademark. 19 In an effort to solve the problem, the Moseleys changed the name of
their store to "Victor's Little Secret." 20 Unsatisfied, V Secret filed suit.2 1 While the
trial court dismissed the claim of trademark infringement, on grounds that there was
no likelihood of confusion between the two marks, the court granted V Secret
summary judgment on its federal trademark dilution claim. 22 On appeal the United
23
States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision.
The Moseleys appealed to the United States Supreme Court. 24 The question before
the Court was whether a plaintiff must establish actual dilution or merely a
25
likelihood of dilution.
The Court held that the Federal Trademark Dilution Act (FTDA) requires proof
26
of "actual dilution," but proof of "actual economic harm" is not required.
Nevertheless, the Court's holding has provided little, if any, guidance for the lower
courts to follow. The post-Moseley decisions demonstrate the uncertainty of the
FTDA. The Court did not address the type of evidence or the factors that courts
should examine in determining whether actual dilution has occurred. Nevertheless,
Wa]-Mart Stores, 529 U.S. at 216.
at 215.
16 Id.
17 TraJFixDevices,532 U.S. at 29-30.
18 V Secret Catalogue, Inc., v. Moseley, 259 F.3d 464, 466 (6th Cir. 2001).
14

15Id.

19Id. at 466-67.
20 Id.
21Id. at 467; see alsoV Secret Catalogue, Inc. v. Moseley, No. 3:98CV-395-S, 2000 WL 370525

(W.D. Ky. Feb. 9, 2000).
22 VSeeret Catalogue, 259 F.3d at 467.
23 See id. at 477.
24 Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue, Inc., 537 U.S. 418 (2003).
25

d. at 421-22.

2(

Id. at 432-33.
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it is clear the Court was bothered by the expansive property-like protection that the
FTDA allowed. The Court had difficulty conceptualizing the abstract harm the
FTDA was allegedly meant to protect against. For example, during oral argument,
one Justice reacted to counsel's hypothetical case of dilution involving Tiffany's
Jewelry Store and a hypothetical TIFFANY'S Restaurant: "That was bad? I mean,
you see, I am so far behind understanding you that I don't know whether you have
just asserted that that's obviously a bad. I think you have. Tiffany's Restaurant is
bad." 27 This uncertainty likely led to the Court's contraction of the doctrine (through
its choice to provide no guidance to lower courts).
Because of the lack of guidance given in Moseley, appellate courts faced with
reviewing a finding of dilution prior to Moseley are all but forced to reverse and
remand for additional consideration. 28 Some courts have expressed their displeasure
with the lack of guidance in applying dilution cases. For example, in Ty Inc. v.
Softbe]]y's, Inc., the Seventh Circuit reversed the district court's judgment in favor of
the plaintiff on a dilution claim. 29 Emphasizing the intervening decision in Moseley,
the court held that the plaintiff had failed to present any evidence to establish actual
dilution.3 0 While acknowledging the need for "trial-type" evidence, the court focused
on the lack of guidance provided in Moseley. "The [Supreme] Court did not explain
and no one seems to know what that 'circumstantial evidence' might be." 31 The court
further expressed its doubt about the ability of a plaintiff to conduct a survey: "We
are not sure what questions could be put to consumers that would elicit a meaningful
answer either in [Moseley] or this [case]."32
Other courts have similarly contemplated the type of evidence necessary,
attempting to remain faithful to Moseley. One court suggested an appropriate
survey to establish actual dilution might involve two surveys: one before the junior
use entered the market and one after. 33 If, after the entry of the junior user, the
survey shows people are less likely to associate the famous trademark with the senior
user, then actual dilution has occurred.3 4 This leaves a trademark holder in the
difficult position of needing a survey at a time period prior to the entry of a junior
user. In other words, once the junior user has entered the market (and the senior
user is aware of the junior user), it would be too late to conduct a survey to establish
dilution. This "guidance" makes a plaintiffs job nearly impossible.
While some courts struggle with applying an unarticulated rule, others have
proceeded by merely recasting old arguments involving a likelihood of dilution in
terms of actual dilution. For example, the District Court for the Middle District of
North Carolina applied Moseley in the domain name context and found actual
dilution because the defendant registered and used a domain name identical to the
27 Transcript of Oral Arguments before the Supreme Court of the United States at *23,
Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue, Inc., 537 U.S. 418 (2003) (No. 10-1015), available at 2002 WL
31643067.
28 See, e.g., Horphag Research, Ltd. v. Pellegrini, 337 F.3d 1036 (9th Cir. 2003); Visa Int'l Serv.
Ass'n. v. JSL Corp., Nos. 02-17353, 03-15420, 2003 WL 23018942 (9th Cir. Dec. 22, 2003).
29 353 F.3d 528 (7th Cir. 2003).
30 Id. at 535.
31 Id. at 536.
32 Id. at 535.
33 See Kellogg Co. v. Toucan Golf, Inc., 337 F.3d 616 (6th Cir. 2003).

34 Id.

[3:258 2004]

John Marshall Review of Intellectual Property Law

plaintiffs famous mark. 35
This holding relied a great deal on Panavision
International,L.P.v. Toeppei 3 6, an early FTDA decision that predated Moseley. The
court reasoned:
Through Defendants' registration and use of their Pinehurst domain names
they have reduced Plaintiffs control over its unique association with its
service marks. Plaintiff has been unable to obtain the registration of
Defendants' Pinehurst domain names. Consequently, Plaintiff is unable to
engage in electronic commerce under these domain names, which has
reduced the selling power of Plaintiffs marks.
'A significant purpose of a domain name is to identify the entity that
owns the web site.' Customers searching for a company's website will often
search using a domain name identical or similar to the company s name or
mark. Defendants' use of domain names identical or confusingly similar to
Plaintiffs marks is likely to prevent or hinder Internet users from accessing
Plaintiffs golf services on the Internet. Customers unable to locate
Plaintiffs website using domain names identical to its marks, such as
'PinehurstResort.com,' 'may fail to continue to search for [P]laintiffs own
home page, due to anger, frustration, or the belief that [Pilaintiffs home
page does not exist.' As a result, the economic value of Plaintiffs marks is
diminished.
Because of the unique nature of domain names in electronic commerce
and the resulting economic harm when marks are registered as domain
names by cyberpirates, Defendants' use of Plaintiffs service marks in their
Pinehurst domain names constitutes dilution.
A customer using the
Internet will be unable to discern any appreciable difference between
Defendants' domain names and Plaintiffs marks. Therefore, the court finds
that Defendants have diluted Plaintiffs service marks in violation of the
FTDA.37
It is difficult to understand what evidence, beyond conclusory allegations of
actual dilution, the court relied on. The District Court for the Southern District of
Georgia made a similar ruling, but attempted to support its decision with the
language of Moseley. In Nike, Inc. v. Variety Wholesalers, Inc., the court applied
Moseley and found actual dilution was established "when the junior and senior
marks are identical" without additional evidence. 38 The court referred to the
statement in Moseley that "it may not be necessary to present direct evidence of
dilution 'if actual dilution can reliably be proven through circumstantial evidencethe obvious case is one where the junior and senior marks are identical."'3 9 Under
the Nike court's interpretation of Moseley, the only circumstantial evidence
necessary to prove actual dilution when the marks are identical is evidence that the

3,Pinehurst, Inc. v. Wick, 256 F. Supp. 2d 424, 431-32 (M.D.N.C. 2003).
36 Panavision Int'l, L.P. v. Toeppen, 141 F.3d 1316 (9th Cir. 1998).
37Pinehurst,256 F. Supp. 2d at 431-32 (citations omitted).
38Nike, Inc. v. Variety Wholesalers, Inc., 274 F. Supp. 2d 1352, 1372 (S.D. Ga. 2003).
3 Id. (quoting Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue, Inc., 537 U.S. 418, 434 (2003)).
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marks are identical. 40 This circular and strained reading of what is arguably dicta is
difficult to support.
Nevertheless, the Northern District of Illinois has also recognized this "domain
name dilution" position in Avalon Indus., Inc. v. Robinson.41 In denying a
defendant's motion to dismiss a dilution claim, the Avalon court held that the
plaintiff might be able to establish actual dilution in the domain name context for
three reasons: (i) "Internet users generally will assume that a domain name is
associated with or sponsored by the owner of that mark;" (2) "[the defendanti's use of
the [disputed] domain name may diminish [the plaintiffi's capacity to identify its own
website and products using its marks;" and (3) "[the defendanti's [disputed] domain
name has the potential to dilute [the plaintiff]'s marks because it permits [the
defendant] to decide what messages and goods are associated with [its] web site and
by extension, with [the plaintiffs] mark."42 Other courts have rejected this plaintiff-

friendly interpretation of dilution, instead requiring circumstantial evidence of actual
43
dilution beyond the mere fact that the marks are identical.
Another question left open by Mosley is whether non-inherently distinctive
marks are even eligible for protection under the FTDA. The FTDA requires that a
mark be both distinctive and famous in order to qualify for protection. 44 The Second
Circuit has interpreted the FTDA to mean that only inherently distinctive marks can
be protected. The Second Circuit first announced this view in Nabisco, Inc., v. PF
Brands, Inc., where the court held that "[i]t is quite clear that the statute intends
distinctiveness, in addition to fame, as an essential element. .

.

. A mark that,

notwithstanding its fame, has no distinctiveness is lacking the very attribute that the
45
antidilution statute seeks to protect."

In Moseley, the Supreme Court cited with approval the Nabisco holding that
distinctiveness and fame are separate statutory requirements, both of which must be
independently proved. 46 The Court also quoted at length an article in the 1927
Harvard Law Review that first proposed the claim of dilution. 47 Dilution should
protect only "an established arbitrary mark that had been 'added to rather than

40

Aik, 294 F.Supp.2d at 1372.

4' Avalon Indus. V. Robinson, No. 01 C 3615, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14920, at *5-6 (N.D. Ill.

Aug. 21, 2003).
42 Id. (citations omitted).
43 See Savin Corp. v. Savin Group, No. 02 Civ. 9377 (SAS), 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19220, at
*44 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 24, 2003) (granting the defendant's motion for summary judgment because the
plaintiff presented "no circumstantial evidence of any kind tending to show actual dilution other
than the fact that the marks are identical"); see also Nitro Leisure Prods., L.L.C. v. Acushnet Co.,
341 F.3d 1356, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (holding that conclusory statements regarding dilution are
insufficient to establish actual dilution' under Moseley).
15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(1) (2000).
4' 191 F.3d 208, 216 (2d Cir. 1999); see also TCPIP Holding Co. v. Haar Communications, Inc.,
244 F.3d 88, 98 (2d Cir. 2001) (holding that "[b]ecause TCPIP's mark, 'The Children's Place,' as a
designator of stores for children's clothing and accessories, is descriptive, and thus, lacks inherent
distinctiveness, it cannot qualify for the protection of the Dilution Act"); N.Y. Stock Exch. v. N.Y.,
N.Y. Hotel, L.L.C., 293 F.3d 550, 556-57 (2d Cir. 2002) (agreeing with the trial court's conclusion
"that the scope of the Lanham Act's anti-dilution protection extends only to those marks that are
inherently distinctive, not to those that derive distinctiveness only from secondary meaning").
46 See Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue, Inc., 537 U.S. 418, 426 n.5 (2003).
47 Id. at 429 n.10.
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withdrawn from the human vocabulary.' 48
The Court's quote from Schechter
includes a passage stating that marks such as STAR, ANCHOR, BULL DOG and
49
GOLD MEDAL are not sufficiently distinctive to be protectable via dilution claims.
Moseley stated in dicta that "the statute intends distinctiveness, in addition to fame,
as an essential element," 50 which might be interpreted to provide support for the
Second Circuit's decision to exclude from the purview of the FTDA those marks with
acquired distinctiveness.
Therefore, Moseley allows for the possibility that
subsequent courts will adopt the Second Circuit's view and only provide protection to
inherently distinctive marks.
Moseley therefore raised more questions than it resolved. However, one thing is
certain: the ability of trademark owners to use the FTDA was greatly restricted.
The fate of the FTDA following Moseley is unknown, and one that likely can only be
remedied through legislative action. Until that point, the FTDA ceases to be a viable
cause of action because of the uncertainty as to what is necessary to prove actual
dilution, and the unpredictability of court decisions as they struggle with that
question.

B. DastarCorp. v. Twentieth CenturyFox Film Corp.
In 1948, General Dwight D. Eisenhower authored a book about the allied
campaign during World War II titled Crusade In Europe.51 The exclusive television
rights were subsequently granted to Twentieth Century Fox Film Corporation
("Fox").52 "Fox, in turn, arranged for Time, Inc., to produce a television series ...
based on the book, and Time assigned its copyright in the series to Fox." 53 The series
first aired in 1949. 54 "Fox ... did not renew the copyright on the Crusade television
55
series, which expired in 1977, leaving the television series in the public domain."
In 1988, Fox reacquired the television rights in General Eisenhower's
book, including the exclusive right to distribute the Crusade television
series on video and to sub-license others to do so ....
SFM Entertainment
and New Line Home Video, Inc., in turn, acquired from Fox the exclusive
rights to distribute Crusade on video. SFM obtained the negatives of the
original television series, restored them, and repackaged the series on
videotape; New Line distributed the videotapes.
In 1995 ... " [a]nticipating renewed interest in World War II on the 50th
anniversary of the War's end, Dastar released a video set entitled World
War II Campaigns in Europe. To make Campaigns, Dastar purchased eight

48 Id. (quoting Frank I. Schechter, The Rational Basis of Trademark Protection, 40 HARV. L.
REV. 813, 829 (1927)).
49 Id.

0 Id. at 426 n.5.
51 Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 123 S. Ct. 2041, 2044 (2003).
52

Id.

53 Id.
54 Id.
55 Id.
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beta cam tapes of the originalversion of the Crusade television series,
which was in the public domain, copied them, and then edited the series...
Dastar manufactured and sold the Campaigns video set as its own
56
product.
Fox filed suit and prevailed at the district court level on its Lanham Act claim,
namely, reverse passing off. 57 Essentially, Fox argued that Dastar failed to properly
credit the Crusade television series. 58 The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
affirmed the judgment on the Lanham Act claim.

59

[T]he Court of Appeals reasoned that 'Dastar copied substantially the
entire Crusade in Europe series created by Twentieth Century Fox, labeled
the resulting product with a different name and marketed it without
attribution to Fox [,] [and] therefore committed a 'bodily appropriation' of
Fox's series.' It concluded that 'Dastar's 'bodily appropriation' of Fox's
60
original [television] series is sufficient to establish the reverse passing off.'
In other words, since the defendant copied the work as a whole, it then was liable for
reverse passing off.

The theory of reverse passing off comes from the Lanham Act's prohibition on
making a "false designation of origin, false or misleading description of fact, or false
or misleading representation of fact, which . . . is likely to cause confusion . . . as to
the origin ... of [its] goods." 61 The Supreme Court held that the defendant's copying

and marketing of the plaintiffs videotape series, which had fallen into the public
domain, did not violate the Lanham Act because the defendant was the origin of the
62
series under the Lanham Act.

While the Supreme Court's holding almost certainly does away with the reverse
passing off sub-doctrine and its reliance on bodily appropriation,6 3 the more
interesting issue touched on by the DastarCourt is the intersection between various
forms of intellectual property rights. The Supreme Court in Dastaragain contracted
trademark rights. The Supreme Court refused to protect a previously copyrighted
product under a reverse passing of rationale. 64 In other words, the Court would not
permit the limited time provision of the copyright and patent clause to be extended
indefinitely via the Lanham Act. 65 As the Court explained, using trademark law as a
"species of mutant copyright law that limits the public's federal right to copy and use
56 Id.
57 Id. at

2044-45.

5S d. at 2044.
59 Id. at 2045; see also Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., v. Entm't Distrib., Nos. 00-56703,

00-56712, 01-55027, 2002 WL 649087 (9th Cir. Apr. 19, 2002).
6o Dastar, 123 S. Ct. at 2045 (quoting Twentieth CenturyFox, 2002 WL 649087, at *1).
61 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (2000).
62 Dastar, 123 S. Ct. at 2050.
63 Cf Williams v. UMG Recordings, Inc., 281 F. Supp. 2d 1177 (C.D. Cal. 2003) (applying
Dastarto bar the plaintiffs claim for relief for not having been credited for his alleged work editing
a film).
64 Dastar, 123 S. Ct. at 2050.
35Id.
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expired copyrights" 66 is unconstitutional because it extends indefinitely the limited
monopoly granted by copyright law.67
This principle conforms with the analogous controlling principle set forth in
Bonito Boats regarding the preemption of patent law:
Where the public has paid the congressionally mandated price for
disclosure, the States may not render the exchange fruitless by offering
patent-like protection to the subject matter of the expired patent. 'It is selfevident that on the expiration of a patent the monopoly created by it ceases
to exist, and the right to make the thing formerly covered by the patent
68
becomes public property.'
Thus, the Court appears unwilling to allow trademark law to be used to extend
the scope or duration of protection under either patent or copyright law. 69 As the
Court explained, this is not a policy-based decision but one grounded in the
Constitution: "To hold otherwise would be akin to finding that § 43(a) [of the Lanham
Act] created a species of perpetual patent and copyright, which Congress may not
do."70
Prior to Dastar,in Chambers v. Time Warner7 l , the court seemingly allowed an
alleged trademark right to expand a then defunct copyright. In Chambers, the
72
defendant operated a web site that permited users to download music.
Notwithstanding the fact that the defendant could permissibly offer the music for
73
sale, the artists brought trademark infringement claims against the defendant.
The court found that the defendant's use of the plaintiffs' names on its web site that
allowed users to download music was not nominative fair use and could cause
confusion in violation of the Lanham Act.74 Therefore, the court denied the
defendant's motion to dismiss. 7 5 In holding that the trademark allegations were
viable causes of action, the court explained: "The fact that the use of an artist's name
or likeness is truthful does not necessarily render the use permissible under the
Lanham Act; a truthful attribution does not automatically dispel false implications
about the artist's affiliation or endorsement of a product or service."7 6 Post-Dastar
decisions reflect the Supreme Court's concern with using trademark law to extend
77
protection for works previously protected under the copyright or patent laws.
66

Id.

at 2048 (quoting Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 165

(1989)).
67 Dastar, 123

S. Ct. at 2050.

489 U.S. at 152 (quoting Singer Mfg. Co. v. June Mfg. Co., 163 U.S. 169, 185 (1896)).
6 See Dastar,123 S. Ct. at 2048-50.
70 I-d. at 2050; see U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cls. 1, 8 ("Congress shall have Power... To promote
the Progress of Science and Useful Arts, by securing for Limited Times to Authors and Inventors the
exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries." (emphasis added)).
71 66 U.S.P.Q. 2d (BNA) 1292 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
2 Id.at 1294.
73Id.at 1293-94.
74Id. at 1294-97.
7,Id.at 1297.
76!-d.at 1296.
77 See gonerally Eco Mfg. L.L.C. v. Honeywell Int'l, Inc., No. 03-2704, 2003 WL 23096007 (7th
Cir. Dec. 31, 2003) (denying manufacturer's motion for a preliminary injunction after holding that a
68
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C. KP PermanentMake-Up, Inc. v. LastingImpressionI, Inc.
Recently, on January 4, 2003, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in KP
PermanentMake-Up, Inc. v. LastingImpression I, Inc.78 This case involves a dispute
between two competitors in the field of micropigmentation and their respective rights
to use the phrase "micro colors." 79 Micropigmentation involves the application of
permanent make-up, applied much like a tattoo.8 0 Its uses can be cosmetic (e.g.,
permanent eye liner) or medical (e.g., correcting pigmentary disorder).81 The district
court granted summary judgment for KP on the issue of fair use.8 2 The Ninth Circuit
reversed because the district court did not also engage in a likelihood of confusion
analysis after finding fair use.8 3 The Supreme Court will resolve the issue of whether
a party that qualifies for fair use must also prove the absence of a likelihood of
confusion.84
This rather esoteric question provides the Supreme Court with another
opportunity to evaluate and adjust the scope of trademark rights. On one hand, it
does not seem reasonable to have a fair use defense that can only be applied in
situations where defendant has established there is no likelihood of confusion. If
there is no likelihood of confusion, there is no need for the defense. Thus, the Ninth
Circuit's position in KP PermanentMake-Up appears to render the fair use defense
85
superfluous.
On the other hand, a primary purpose of trademark law is to prevent consumer
confusion.8 6 If a defendant's use is fair, and substantial public confusion is still
present, should a court disregard this public harm? Other equitable defenses can be
87
overcome and liability imposed if confusion is present.
It is unclear what the Supreme Court will do. Following its new textualist
philosophy, it seems likely that the Court will focus its attention on the statutory
language. This approach however, might be problematic. The fair use defense has
developed over time, stemming from common law,8 8 and the scant attention paid to it
in the Lanham Act does not accurately capture the nuances of the doctrine. Thus, a
new textualist resolution might be unsatisfactory.

thermostat's external round shape, formerly the subject of utility and design patents and later
protected via an incontestable trademark registration, was likely functional).
78 124 S.Ct. 981 (2003).
79 KP Permanent Make-Up, Inc. v. Lasting Impression I, Inc., 328 F.3d 1061, 1064-66 (9th Cir.
2003).
80 Id. at 1065.
81 Id.
82 Id.

at 1066.
at 1073.
81 Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
83 Id.

at *i,KP Permanent Make-Up, Inc. v. Lasting Impression I, Inc., 328 F.3d 1061 (9th Cir. 2003) (No.
03-409).
85 See KPPermanentMake-Up, Inc., 328 F. 3d 1061.
86 See, e.g., Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. L. & L. Wings, Inc., 962 F.2d 316, 318 (4th Cir. 1992)
(stating that "the purpose of trademark law is to protect the public from confusion").
87 See, e.g., SunAmerica Corp. v. Sun Life Assurance Co. of Can., 77 F.3d 1325 (11th Cir. 1996)
(holding that a showing of inevitable confusion can overcome the estoppel effect of acquiescence).
88 See Cairns v. Franklin Mint Co., 292 F.3d 1139, 1150 (9th Cir. 2002) (stating that "the
common law classic fair use defense [was] codified in the Lanham Act").
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II. SUBDOCTRINES

Taking a cue from the Supreme Court's recent shift away from hypothesized
harms and expansive rights towards the need for empirical evidence of confusion,
subdoctrines have started to contract and have been refined to help better maintain
the proper balance of rights. Given the wide variety of views on several subdoctrines,
we should expect some unpredictability over the next few years as courts continue to
apply and refine them to new fact patterns. There are two subdoctrines that
expanded wildly during the Internet days and that are currently being scrutinized:
initial interest confusion and nominative fair use.

A. The InitialInterest Confusion Doctrine
Initial interest confusion involves confusion that catches the initial interest of
the consumer but is dissipated prior to a purchase.8 9 In other words, it is the classic
"bait and switch." While this doctrine dates back nearly thirty years, 90 its notoriety
grew when the Ninth Circuit applied it in the Internet context. 91
While the doctrine's popularity has grown, it should be noted that some courts
still have refused to adopt it.92
Nevertheless, since Brookfield in 1999, the
application of the doctrine in the domain name and metatag context is clear. Now
courts are faced with considering new fact patterns, particularly on the Internet.
One court recently applied the doctrine in the context of pop-up
advertisements. 93 There, under the aegis of initial interest confusion, the defendant
was enjoined from causing its competing pop-up advertisements to appear when a
web user accessed the plaintiffs web site. 94 Others have rejected this extension (in
identical fact patterns). The United States District Court for the Eastern District of
95
Michigan found WhenU.com's conduct to be legitimate comparative advertising,
and the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia agreed not
96
to impose liability for such pop-up advertisements.

89 See Brookfield Communications, Inc. v. West Coast Entm't Corp., 174 F.3d 1036, 1062 (9th
Cir. 1999).
90 See Grotrian, Helfferich, Schulz, Th. Steinweg Nachf. v. Steinway & Sons, 523 F.2d 1331 (2d
Cir. 1975).
91 See Brooktleld, 174 F.3d 1036.
92 See, e.g., Beacon Mutual Ins. Co. v. OneBeacon Ins. Group, 290 F. Supp. 2d 241, 246 n.4
(D.R.I. 2003) (noting that while the Second, Third, Fifth, Seventh and Ninth Circuits have adopted
the doctrine, the First Circuit has yet to do so).
93 See 1-800 Contacts, Inc. v. WhenU.com, Inc., 02 Civ. 8043 (DAB), 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
22932, at *1-2 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 22, 2003).
94Id. at *110.
95,
Wells Fargo & Co. v. WhenU.com, Inc., 293 F. Supp. 2d 734, 761 (E.D. Mich. 2003) (noting
that the tying of pop-up advertisements to a competitor's web site is not a violation of the Lanham
Act because trademark laws "are not meant to protect consumer goodwill [sic] created through
extensive, skillful, and costly advertising")(quoting Smith v. Chanel, Inc., 402 F.2d 562, 566 (9th Cir.

1968)).
96U-Haul Int'l, Inc. v. WhenU.com, Inc., 279 F. Supp. 2d 723, 729 (E.D. Va. 2003) (holding that
the tying of pop-up advertisements to a competitor's web site is not a violation of the Lanham Act
because the defendant's conduct does not involve use of the plaintiffs trademark in commerce).
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An ongoing concern with initial interest confusion is the ease with which courts
can find liability without empirical evidence or even consumer confusion. For
example, in HorphagResearch, Ltd. v. Pellegrini the court found, as a matter of law,
that the defendant had committed trademark infringement because the defendant
"admit[ted] to using [the plaintiffs] trademark and specifically admit[ed] to using the
97
... mark in the meta-tags for his websites."
In another case, only five unique users
were redirected from the infringing domain name to the defendant's competing web
site. 98 This was nevertheless deemed sufficient to support a finding of initial interest
confusion and liability under the Lanham Act.99 Similarly, one court explained the
harmful aspect of initial interest confusion (which, surprisingly, was not customer
confusion):
The harm to [the] Plaintiff from initial interest confusion lies not in the
loss of Internet users who are unknowingly whisked away from [the]
Plaintiffs website; instead, the harm to the Plaintiff from initial interest
confusion lies in the possibility that, through the use of pop-up
advertisements the Defendant... "would gain crucial credibility during the
initial phases of a deal." 100
In light of the Supreme Court's current discomfort with inchoate harms and
unsupported presumptions, some courts are beginning to contract the scope of the
doctrine. As one court explained, "consumers diverted on the Internet can more
readily get back on track than those in actual space, and thus the harm from
consumers becoming trapped in a competing web site is easily avoided." 10 1
Recognizing the easily hypothesized (and avoidable) harm, the Second Circuit
requires a "showing of intentional deception on the part of the defendant before
imposing liability." 10 2 In granting summary judgment for the defendant and
rejecting a finding of initial interest confusion, the court focused on the lack of actual
evidence put forth to establish confusion.103
Finally, this shift is apparent in a surprising concurring opinion from the Ninth
Circuit. The Ninth Circuit, having made the doctrine famous in Brookie]d, appears
now to be backing away from it. The court in Playboy Enterprises,Inc. v. Netseape
Communications Corp.'0 4 reversed the lower court's granting of summary judgment
for the defendant where the defendant was using the plaintiffs trademarks to key
advertisements on its search engine. The court relied on the initial interest
confusion doctrine. Judge Berzon, however, wrote a powerful concurrence calling the
337 F.3d 1036, 1040(9th Cir. 2003).
Flow Control Indus., Inc. v. AMHI, Inc., 278 F. Supp. 2d 1193, 1199 (W.D. Wash. 2003).
9 Id. at 1199-1202 (granting the plaintiffs motion for summary judgment on trademark
infringement claim brought under the Lanham Act after finding initial interest confusion).
100 1-800 Contacts, Inc. v. WhenU.com, Inc., 02 Civ. 8043 (DAB), 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22932,
at *69 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 22, 2003) (quoting Mobil Oil Corp. v. Pegasus Petroleum Corp., 818 F.2d 254,
259 (2d Cir. 1987).
101 Savin Corp. v. Savin Group, No. 02 Civ. 9377 (SAS), 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19220, at *36
(S.D.N.Y. Oct. 24, 2003).
97

98

103

Id.
Id. at *37.

104

354 F.3d 1020 (9th Cir. 2004).

102
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entire sub-doctrine into question. 10 5 In this concurrence, Judge Berzon argued that
most cases of initial interest confusion do not involve confusion at all but rather
consumer choice.
There is a big difference between hijacking a customer to another
website by making the customer think he or she is visiting the trademark
holder's website . . . and just distracting a potential customer with another
choice, when it is clear that it is a choice . .. I do not think it is reasonable
to find initial interest confusion when a consumer is never confused as to
the source or affiliation, but instead knows, or should know, from the outset
that a product or web link is not related to that of the trademark holder
because the list produced by the search engine so informs him. 106
Finally, Judge Berzon concluded by calling the doctrine itself into doubt:
"Should the question arise again, in this case or some other, this court needs to
107
consider whether we want to continue to apply an unsupportable rule."
The status of the initial interest confusion doctrine is therefore uncertain. The
current trend is to apply the doctrine in such a way as to require some empirical
foundation (beyond mere presumptions or conclusory statements) for a finding of
liability.

B. The Nominative FairUse Defense
Nominative fair use was first articulated a little over a decade ago in New Kids
on the Block v. News America Publ'g, Inc.108 In New Kids, two newspapers were
running telephone polls asking readers to vote for their favorite "New Kid."109 The
New Kids on the Block sued the newspapers for trademark infringement. 110 The
Ninth Circuit found the papers' use permissible, but only after creating the thennovel nominative fair use doctrine that applied where the defendant was using the
plaintiffs trademark to refer to the plaintiffs product.111 In these limited situations,
the court noted that the traditional likelihood of confusion analysis gives way to a
special three-pronged test. 112
This nominative fair use defense insulates a
commercial defendant if three requirements are met:
(1) the product or service in question must be one not readily identifiable
without use of the trademark;
(2) only so much of the mark or marks may be used as is reasonably
necessary to identify the product or service; and

105

Id. at 1034 (Berzon, J., concurring).

106Id.

at 1035 (emphasis in original).
107Id. at 1036.
108 971 F.2d 302 (9th Cir. 1992).
109 Id. at 308-09.
110 Id. at 304.
111

Id. at 308.

112

Id.
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(3) the defendant must do nothing that would, in conjunction with the
113
mark, suggest sponsorship or endorsement by the trademark holder.
114
Since New Kids, other circuits have been less than receptive to the doctrine.
In fact, no other Circuit has explicitly adopted the defense. Nevertheless, the Ninth
Circuit continues to apply and refine the doctrine.
For example, the Ninth Circuit recently held that the use of another's trademark
in metatags with the purpose of diverting consumers to a competing web site does not
qualify for nominative fair use. 115 Similarly, in Brother Records, Inc. v. Jardine, a
former member of the Beach Boys musical group was using the trademark "The
Beach Boys" to advertise his current concert tour. 116 Because defendant's use
suggested sponsorship by the Beach Boys, the court held that the use did not qualify
as nominative fair use. 117 In other words, defendant failed the third prong of the test,
118
namely doing nothing that would suggest sponsorship or endorsement.
In contrast, in J.K Harris& Co. v. Kasse] the court applied the nominative fair
use test to deny the plaintiffs request for injunctive relief. 119 The plaintiff, a large
tax representation and negotiation company, operated a web site at
www.jkharris.com. 120
The defendant operated a competing web site at
www.taxes.com. 12 1 Unfavorable information about the plaintiff was published on the
defendant's website. 122 One page was entitled "JK Harris Employees Tell of
Wrongdoing While Complaints Pile Up."1 23 The defendant also solicited information
critical of the plaintiff to publish on its web site. 124 The defendant had also allegedly
manipulated its web site so that search engine requests for the plaintiff would also

produce the defendant's web site on the results lists.

125

This was allegedly done via

126
keyword density, use of header and underline results tags, and the use of hot links.
The defendant's efforts had succeeded in that its web site appeared on the results list
127
of several search engines when the plaintiffs trade name was searched.
Nevertheless, the court rejected initial interest confusion because the nominative fair
use doctrine applied. 128 The court found that, although it was used frequently, the
defendant's use of the plaintiffs trade name was not more than was reasonably

"3

Id

See, e.g., PACCAR, Inc. v. Telescan Techs., L.L.C., 319 F.3d 243, 258 (6th Cir. 2003)
(refusing to adopt the nominative fair use defense); Basic Fun, Inc. v. X-Concepts, L.L.C., 157 F.
Supp. 2d 449, 457 (E.D. Pa. 2001) (holding that "[t]he Third Circuit does not recognize 'nominative'
fair use defense, which is utilized as a defense solely in the Ninth Circuit").
115 Soe Horphag Research, Ltd. v. Pellegrini, 337 F.3d 1036, 1042 (9th Cir. 2003).
116 Brother Records, Inc. v. Jardine, 318 F.3d 900, 902 (9th Cir. 2003).
117 Id. at 908.
114

Id.
119 253 F. Supp. 2d 1120, 1127 (N.D. Cal. 2003).
120 Id. at 1122.
121 Id.
118

122

Id.

123

Id.

124

Id.

125

Id.
Id. at 1123.

126
127

128

Id.
Id. at 1126.
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necessary to accomplish its
Similarly, in Mattel Inc. v.
nominative fair use defense
defendant used Barbie Dolls

purpose, namely to criticize the plaintiffs business. 129
Walking Mountain Productions, the court applied the
to avoid reaching a First Amendment issue. 130 There,
in a series of photographs in an attempt to "critique ...

the objectification of women associated with [Barbie], and .

.

. [to] lambaste .

.

. the

conventional beauty myth and the societal acceptance of women as objects because
this is what Barbie embodies." 131 In granting the photographer's motion for
132
summary judgment, the court found his use to qualify as a nominative fair use.
Specifically, the photographer used Barbie to refer to the doll, used only as much as
was necessary, and did nothing that would cause others to think Mattel had
1 33
sponsored the exhibits.
While the doctrine has not captivated many beyond the Ninth Circuit, recent
decisions possibly indicate a need for such a doctrine. 13 4 In Chambers, the court held
"[t]he fact that the use of an artist's name or likeness is truthful does not necessarily
render the use permissible under the Lanham Act" even though the defendant was
selling songs sung by the artist and that the defendant was legally permitted to
sell.1 35 Imposing Lanham Act liability for displaying an artist's name next to a song
that one can legitimately sell is troubling. While it seems that the holding in Dastar
should be sufficient to remedy this problem, the nominative fair use test might
provide an easy (non-Constitutional) basis for getting to the right outcome.

III. THE INTERNET
Notwithstanding that all three of the most recent Supreme Court cases involved
bricks-and-mortar situations, much of the recent development in trademark law has
involved, and been spurred by, the Internet.
The decision with the most far-reaching implications occurred, not surprisingly,
in the Ninth Circuit.1 36 There, Judge Kozinski concluded that domain names are
1 37
property. "Kremen ... had an intangible property right in his domain name."
Network Solutions Incorporated ("NSI") gave away Kremen's domain name,
www.sex.com, based on an obviously forged letter by Cohen. 138 Kremen, unable to
collect his judgment against Cohen, attempted to impose liability on NSI for
unlawfully transferring his domain name to a third party. 13 9 The court held that
Kremen could state a cause of action for conversion, because domain names were, in
fact, a kind of property that could be converted. 140 Judge Kozinski held that domain
129

Id.

Mattel, Inc. v. Walking Mountain Prods., 353 F.3d 792, 808 (9th Cir. 2003).
Id. at 796.
132 Id. at 809.
133 Id. at 812.
134
SeO, O.g., Chambers v. Time Warner, No. 00 Civ. 2839 (JSR), 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3065
(S.D.N.Y. March 4, 2003).
135 Id. at *10.
136 Kremen v. Cohen, 337 F.3d 1024 (9th Cir. 2003).
137 Id. at 1030.
138 Id. at 1035.
139 Id. at 1029.
140 Id. at 1036.
130
131
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names met the three criteria for property: (1) they constitute interests capable of
precise definition; (2) they can be subjected to exclusive control; and (3) they are such
that the putative owner can establish a legitimate claim to exclusivity.14 1 Aside from
resolving an issue of first impression and giving Kremen the potential to collect from
142
NSI, this decision makes domain name misuse subject to the common law of torts.
Importantly, under a conversion theory, an alleged tortfeasor is faced with strict
liability.

143

In a different fact pattern prior to Kremen, a domain name registrar avoided
liability when it tendered control of a domain name to the French Court after a party
filed suit over the domain name in France. 144 The court would still permit the former
domain name registrant to bring an action for reverse domain name hijacking
against the new registrant (but not the registrar) even though the domain name was
transferred pursuant to a foreign court's order. 145 In addition, the court held that it
would not give deference to any prior decision by a foreign court. 146 Assuming
Kremen is adopted, it is unclear whether registrars might potentially be held liable
in situations like these.
Recently, another issue of first impression was similarly resolved. Use of
another's
trademark
in
the
post-domain
path
of
a
URL
(i.e.,
www.domainname.com/post/domailpath) does not likely constitute trademark
infringement.

147

The post-domain path of a URL, however, does not typically signify
source. The post-domain path merely shows how the website's data is
organized within the host computer's files. Typically, web pages containing
the post-domain paths are not reached by entering the full URL into a
browser; instead, these secondary pages are usually reached via a link from
148
the website's homepage, which does not contain a post-domain path.
Similarly, use of another's trademark in a domain name gripe site (i.e.,
XXXsucks.com), without more, does not constitute commercial use, and therefore the
Lanham Act does not apply. 149 In declining to grant relief, the court observed that,
"[the plaintiff] concedes that [the defendant] is 'free to shout '[the plaintiff] Sucks!'
from the rooftops.' Essentially, this is what he has done in his domain name. The
150
rooftops of our past have evolved into the Internet domain names of our present."

141

ITd. at 1030.

112 Id. at
143 Id. at

1036.
1035.

144

Hawes v. Network Solutions, Inc., 337 F.3d 377, 383 (4th Cir. 2003).

11

Id. at 383.
Id. at 386.

146
147

2003).

See Interactive Prods. Corp. v. a2z Mobile Office Solutions, Inc., 326 F.3d 687 (6th Cir.

Id. at 696-97 (citation omitted).
Se Taubman Co. v. Webfeats, 319 F.3d 770, 780 (6th Cir. 2003).
150 Id.at 778 (citations omitted).
148
149
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A. Anti-Cybersquatting Consumer ProtectionAct (A CPA)
The Anti-Cybersquatting Consumer Protection Act (ACPA) provides for
injunctive relief and statutory damages if a party "registers, traffics in, or uses a
domain name" with "a bad faith intent to profit." 151 Although the effective date of the
ACPA was November 19, 1999,152 it is now well settled that statutory damages are
available for domain names registered prior to the enactment of the ACPA for "postenactment use or trafficking." 153 In addition, the FordMotorCourt held that an offer
to sell (with nothing more) was "trafficking" in a domain name in violation of the
ACPA.154 Also, at least one court has held that transferring a domain name pursuant
to the ACPA from a foreign registrant obtained via a foreign registrar does not
constitute an extraterritorial application of the Lanham Act because the res is
155
located in the United States.

B. Uniform Domain -NameDispute Resolution Policy ("UDRP")
In 1999, the Uniform Domain-Name Dispute Resolution Policy ("UDRP")
outlined a quasi-judicial proceeding to deal with domain name disputes. "Disputes
alleged to arise from abusive registrations of domain names (for example,
cybersquatting) may be addressed by expedited administrative proceedings that the
holder of trademark rights initiates by filing a complaint with an approved disputeresolution service provider."1 56
These administrative hearings provide quick,
inexpensive and effective means for dealing with cybersquatters.
Although
independent of the Lanham Act and the federal judiciary, courts have recently
commented on such proceedings.
For example, a dispute-resolution proceeding pursuant to the URDP is not
considered to be arbitration falling under the Federal Arbitration Act ("FAA").157
This is significant because judicial review under the FAA is limited to a motion to
vacate pursuant to section ten of the FAA, which only permits reversal in situations
of "evident partiality or corruption ... [or] misconduct" of the arbitrator. 158 Instead,
an appeal of an adverse UDRP decision is pursuant to the ACPA, which provides a
cause of action to challenge such decisions. 159 Court review under the ACPA (rather
than the FAA) is essential because "the administrative process prescribed by the
UDRP is 'adjudication lite' as a result of the streamlined nature and its loose
rules."1

60

15115

Importantly, a reviewing court does not defer to a prior UDRP decision:
U.S.C. § 1125(d)(1)(A) (2000).

152

Id.

153

See, e.g., Ford Motor Co. v. Catalanotte, 342 F.3d 543, 548 (6th Cir. 2003).

151Id. at 549.
155 Cable News Network, LP v. CNNews.com, No. 02-1112, 2003 WL 152846, at *2-3 (4th Cir.

Jan. 23, 2003).
51 ICANN Uniform Domain-Name Dispute-Resolution Policy General Information, available
at http://www.icann.org/udrp/hdrp.htm (last visited Mar. 28, 2004).
157 Dluhos v. Strasberg, 321 F.3d 365, 372 (3d Cir. 2003).
158 9 U.S.C. § 10(a) (2000).
159 See 15 U.S.C. § 1114(2)(D)(v).
160 Barcelona.com, Inc. v. Excelentisimo Ayuntamiento De Barcelona, 330 F.3d 617, 624 (4th
Cir. 2003).

[3:258 2004]

Recent Developments in Trademark Law

16 1
"[Tihe WIPO panelist's decision is not even entitled to deference on the merits."
The Barelona.eom court made clear that a WIPO proceeding has no impact on the
merits of an ACPA claim stating "any decision made by a panel under the UDRP is
no more than an agreed-upon administration that is not given any deference under
the ACPA."162 Similarly, failing to assert a claim in a UDRP proceeding does not
163
prevent a party from raising it in a subsequent federal action.

C. Jurisdiction
The Internet jurisdiction test announced in Zi po Mfg. Co. v. Zippo Dot Corn,
Inc., was based on a sliding scale approach classifying web sites as passive or
interactive. 164 A highly interactive commercial web site supported a finding of
personal jurisdiction, while a passive web site did not. 165 However, the flaws in this
analysis are beginning to show as courts are returning to a traditional "minimum
contacts" analysis. For example, in Hy Cite Corp. v. Badbusinessbureau.eom,L.L.C.,
the court declined to adopt the Zippo test:
[1it is not clear why a website's level of interactivity should be
determinative on the issue of personal jurisdiction ....
[R]egardless how
interactive a website is, it cannot form the basis for personal jurisdiction
unless a nexus exists between the website and the cause of action or unless
the contacts through the website are so substantial that they may be
considered 'systematic and continuous' for the purpose of general
166
jurisdiction.
The court concluded that "a rigid adherence to the Zippo test is likely to lead to
erroneous results."1 67 Going forward, plaintiffs would be well advised to ascertain
whether a defendant has sufficient minimum contacts with the forum beyond merely
having an interactive website.

IV.

OTHER TRADEMARK USES AND RIGHTS

Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act "permits celebrities to vindicate property rights
in their identities against allegedly misleading commercial use by others." 168 In
Parks,the Sixth Circuit found that Rosa Parks had a viable cause of action under the

61

Id. at 623.

162 Id. at 626.
163 See Storey v. Cello Holdings, L.L.C., 347 F.3d 370, 381-82 (2d Cir. 2003).
161 952 F. Supp. 1119, 1124 (W.D. Pa. 1997).

Id.
166 297 F. Supp. 2d 1154, 1160 (W.D. Wis. 2004).
107 Id see also Toys "R" Us, Inc. v. Step Two, S.A., 318 F.3d 446, 458 (3d Cir. 2003) (finding no
105

personal jurisdiction in spite of a highly interactive commercial web site because there was no
evidence of contacts with the forum state).
108 Parks v. LaFace Records, 329 F.3d 437, 445 (6th Cir. 2003).
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Lanham Act for defendant's use of her name in the title of a song. 169 Nevertheless, a
famous person cannot attempt "to constitute . . . himself as a walking, talking
trademark." 170 In ETW Corp., the licensing agent for Tiger Woods attempted to
prevent an artist from selling prints depicting Woods' 1997 victory at the Masters
Tournament in Augusta, Georgia. 171 "[Ais a general rule, a person's image or
likeness cannot function as a trademark." 172 Indeed, for a celebrity like Woods, the
court speculated that there must be thousands of images of him in photographs,
paintings, and other forms: "[n]o reasonable person could believe that merely because
these photographs or paintings contain Woods' likeness or image, they all originated
with Woods."173

Only when a particular image has been "consistently used" in the

advertising and sale of specific goods and services can that image or likeness be
174
protected as a trademark.
Analogously, trademark rights must give way to parodies.
A company
manufactured and sold tee-shirts portraying various World Wrestling Entertainment
("WWE") stars as dogs. 175 For example, WWE superstar Stone Cold Steve Austin
with his catch-phrase "Open Up a Can of Woop Ass!" was caricatured (as a dog) as
Bone Cold Steve Pawstin and the phrase "Open Up a Can of Woof Ass!" 176 In
granting the defendant's motion for summary judgment, the court deemed the
defendant's t-shirts to be deemed parodies and thus unlikely to cause consumer
confusion.1 77 Likewise, courts appear unwilling to provide a cause of action for
"unflattering" use of a product. The popular children's toy, "Slip 'N Slide," was
misused in a comedic scene in the film, "Dickie Roberts: Former Child Star."178 In
the scene, the character uses the Slip 'N Slide without water (causing large red
abrasions on the character's chest) and then with cooking oil (causing the character
to slide far too fast and run into a picket fence).179 The manufacturer of the Slip 'N
Slide brought suit.180 The plaintiffs causes of action for dilution (under both the
tarnishment and blurring theories) and trademark infringement were rejected as the
court denied the plaintiffs motion for a temporary restraining order.18 1 In addition,
18 2
the court found that the defendant's use qualified as nominative fair use.
Finally, courts are beginning to pay close attention to the use requirement of
trademark law. In Boule v. Hutton, the plaintiffs sued the children of the artist of a
painting they wished to sell for alleged misrepresentations regarding the paintings

169
170

Id. at 463.

ETW Corp. v. Jireh Publ'g, Inc., 332 F.3d 915, 922 (6th Cir. 2003).
Id. at 918-19.
172 Id. at 922.
173 Id. at 922.
174 ITd. at 923.
175 World Wrestling Fed'n Entm't, Inc. v. Big Dog Holdings, Inc. 280 F. Supp. 2d 413, 418 (W.D.
Pa. 2003).
176 Id. at 420.
177 Id. at 437-38.
178 WhamO, Inc. v. Paramount Pictures Corp., 286 F. Supp. 2d 1254, 1255 (N.D. Cal. 2003).
179 ITd. at 1257-58.
180 Id. at 1255.
181 ITd. at 1264-65; see also Caterpillar, Inc. v. Walt Disney Co., 287 F. Supp. 2d 913 (C.D. Ill.
171

2003).
182

Wham-O, 286 F. Supp. 2d at 1264.
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authenticity.18 3 One of the children had signed a certificate of authenticity for the
painting. 8 4
Later, the children signed a letter repudiating that claim, and
subsequently repeated that repudiation in articles in art publications.1 8 5 The
plaintiff sued under the Lanham Act for the statements made in the repudiation
letter, as well as statements in one of the art publications.18 6 On appeal, the Second
Circuit affirmed the trial court's summary judgment that the defendants had not
violated the Lanham Act.18 7 The statements made in the context of an art magazine
188
were not commercial speech; the article addressed a matter of public concern.
Furthermore, because the authenticity of the plaintiffs paintings had not been
18 9
proven, no statement in the repudiation letter had been shown false or misleading.

V. THE MADRID PROTOCOL
On November 2, 2003, the United States joined the Madrid Protocol. 190 The
Madrid Protocol creates a centralized filing system by which trademark owners in
member countries can obtain and maintain trademark rights in multiple countries by
filing a single set of documents. Over sixty jurisdictions are parties to the Madrid
Protocol.
Under the Madrid Protocol, a trademark owner files a single Madrid Application
based on the basic application with the basic application's trademark office ("Office of
Origin"). The Office of Origin examines the Madrid Application and certifies that the
information in the Madrid Application is the same information contained in the basic
application or registration. Following a review by the International Bureau of the
World of Intellectual Property Organization ("WIPO"), WIPO publishes the Madrid
Application in the WIPO Gazette ofInternationalMarks and conveys the information
in the application to all of the member countries that the trademark owner has
designated.
The member countries that receive the Madrid Application information from
WIPO treat the application as a properly filed national application, independently
examining the application under the same standards they use to examine national
applications. If accepted, the Madrid Registration takes effect and the trademark
owner enjoys the same rights as if the application had passed through the national
registration system. The Madrid Registration's term is ten years. Trademark
owners can renew the Madrid Registration for another ten years through a single
filing with WIPO. This renews any national rights the trademark owner obtained in
member countries. A single filing with WIPO can also accomplish any postregistration modifications such as changes of name or address.
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190 This section borrows heavily from the research of Beverly W. Pattishall, David C. Hilliard
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VI. CONCLUSION
2003 saw a great deal of activity in the ongoing development of trademark law.
The Supreme Court appears troubled by inchoate harms (Moseley), judge made
subdoctrines (Dastar), and the use of trademark law to extend copyright and patent
protection (Dastar). Lower courts appear to be, by and large, taking this lead and are
moving away from presumptions. Similarly, several issues of first impression were
resolved, including the conclusion that domain names are a form of property. While
2003 saw a contraction of trademark rights, this is not necessarily a negative
development for trademark owners.
Instead, courts are merely refining the
underlying doctrine and requiring the same types of empirical foundations that have
been required for decades.

